

21 January 1956

and
The Honorable Herbert Hoover, Jr.
Under Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Herb:

Attached is a draft of a proposed letter
on the scientific intelligence problems. I am not
sending it formally until I have had a chance to
discuss it with you.

Faithfully yours,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Encl.

AWD:hea
Distribution:
Addressee - Orig
DCI - 1 cc
ER - 1 cc ✓
Reading - 1 cc
DD/I - 1 cc
AD/OSI - 2 cc

L. Hale



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR


20 January 1956

The Honorable Herbert Hoover, Jr.
Under Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Herb:

Attached is ^a ~~my~~ draft letter on the
^{intelligence} Scientific ~~Attache~~ problem. I am not ~~not~~ sending
it formally

Sincerely,


Allen W. Dulles
Director

Encl.

(until I have had a
chance to discuss
it with you.)

21 January 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE**SUBJECT: Scientific Intelligence**

1. Intelligence with respect to scientific achievements within the Communist Bloc countries is a highest priority target. In addition to the information to be obtained within the Bloc, contacts with non-Soviet Bloc scientists and coverage of international scientific conferences in the Free World are increasingly valuable for obtaining information on Soviet Bloc activities.

2. It is my firm belief that our national security requires the utmost effort and coordination of effort to build up this type of intelligence coverage and also to follow significant scientific developments in the Free World. In the overt field the Departments of State, Defense, the CIA and certain other agencies have a substantial potential. The coordination of this work and the capabilities of each should be strengthened.

3. Recommendation No. 6 of the Clark Task Force report on Intelligence, transmitted by the Hoover Commission stated: 'That the responsibility for collection of scientific intelligence be removed from the State Department and placed in the hands of the CIA, with authority to appoint such scientific attaches as may be necessary to carry on this work abroad. We do not concur in this recommendation in the form presented. We believe that the scientific attache structure should be reconstituted under the Department of State but with technical support and guidance on the intelligence aspects furnished by CIA through its Office of Scientific Intelligence and with guidance from the Department of Defense as its interests may appear.

~~SECRET~~

4. Accordingly, we suggest that you give consideration to the appointment of a Science Adviser to the Secretary of State with such title and authority as you may determine, and that a small office be constituted in the Department of State under the Science Adviser. CIA

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

appropriate. CIA will undertake the appropriate analysis and dissemination within the government of the scientific intelligence reports which may flow through this office.

5. It is further recommended that the State Department designate, after consultation with CIA, Science Attaches to appropriate embassies abroad, in particular to London, Paris, New Delhi, Stockholm, Tokyo, and to posts within the Communist orbit, including in particular Moscow, as the situation may permit. The situation presents special problems and may require, at the moment, different handling.

(b)(3)

NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

7. Arrangements should be made through the office of the Science Adviser and through the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) of CIA to draw upon the resources of the National Academy of Science, the National Science Foundation, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the California Institute of Technology, and like institutions, and to enlist their support in obtaining appropriate designees for the posts of Science Attache and in supplementing the work outlined in this memorandum.

8. The existing foreign facilities of the Department of State, Defense and CIA in the overt scientific intelligence collection field should be closely coordinated with the above proposed structure for a foreign scientific collection mechanism. Foreign targets

~~SECRET~~

and opportunities should be appropriately assigned as between the respective departments and agencies so as to cover the field as adequately as possible to ensure that friendly foreign scientists knowledgeable in Soviet Bloc scientific techniques or in new scientific advances in their own countries are contacted and that the flow of foreign scientific literature, particularly from Soviet orbit countries be increased.

3. I consider this a matter of great urgency and importance. From my conversations I feel assured that the American scientific community will lend its cooperation in making this program effective and in helping with the analysis of information which may be received. I bespeak your early attention to this important matter.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

AWD:hea
Distribution:
Addressee - Orig & 1 cc
DCI - 1 cc
ER - 1 cc ✓ (w/drafts)
Reading - 1 cc
DD/I - 1 cc
AD/OSI - 2 cc



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

19 January 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Scientific Intelligence

1. Intelligence with respect to scientific achievements in the Communist Bloc countries is a highest priority target. ~~This includes in particular intelligence relating to developments in the field of atomic weapons, guided missiles, aircraft, jet propulsion engines, electronic devices and counter devices, and the like.~~ *within*
Contacts with non-Soviet bloc scientists and coverage of international scientific conferences are ~~considered to be~~ increasingly valuable for obtaining information on Soviet bloc activities. *In the free world*

2. It is my firm belief that our national security requires the utmost effort and coordination of effort to build up this type of intelligence coverage and also to follow significant scientific developments in the free world. The Departments of State, Defense, the CIA and certain other agencies have a substantial potential, ~~in this field.~~ *In the over field*
The coordination of ^{its} work and the capabilities of each should be strengthened.

3. Recommendation No. 6 of the Clark Task Force report on Intelligence, transmitted by the Hoover Commission stated: "That the responsibility for collection of scientific intelligence be removed from the State Department and placed in the hands of the CIA, with authority to appoint such scientific attaches as may be necessary to carry on this work abroad." We do not concur in this recommendation in the form presented. We believe that the scientific attache structure should be reconstituted under the Department of State but with technical support and guidance on the intelligence aspects furnished by CIA through its Office of Scientific Intelligence *and with guidance from the Department of Defense as its interests may suggest appear.*

4. Accordingly, we suggest that you give consideration to the appointment of a Science Adviser to the Secretary of State with such title and authority as you may determine, and that a small office be constituted in the Department of State under the Science Adviser.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

the extent we may mutually determine to be appropriate. CIA will undertake the appropriate analysis and dissemination within the government of the scientific intelligence reports which may flow through this office.

5. It is further recommended that the State Department designate, after consultation with CIA, Science Attaches to appropriate embassies abroad, in particular to London, Paris, New Delhi, ~~Bombay~~, Stockholm, Tokyo, and to posts within the Communist orbit, including in particular Moscow, as the situation may permit. The [] situation presents special problems and may require, at the moment, different handling.

(b)(3)

NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct


7. Arrangements should be made through the office of the Science Adviser and through the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) of CIA to draw upon the resources of the National Academy of Science, the National Science Foundation, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the California Institute of Technology, and like institutions, and to enlist their support in obtaining appropriate designees for the posts of Science Attache and in supplementing the work outlined in this memorandum.

8. The existing foreign facilities of the Department of State, Defense and CIA in the scientific intelligence collection field should be closely coordinated with, ~~or integrated into~~, the above proposed structure for a foreign scientific collection mechanism. Foreign

100-2-
~~SECRET~~

targets and opportunities should be appropriately assigned as between the respective departments and agencies so as to cover the field as adequately as possible to ensure that friendly foreign scientists knowledgeable in Soviet bloc scientific techniques or in new scientific advances in their own countries are contacted and that the flow of foreign scientific literature, particularly from Soviet orbit countries be increased.

9. I consider this a matter of great urgency and importance. From my conversations I feel assured that the American scientific community will lend its cooperation in making this program effective and in helping with the analysis of information which may be received. I bespeak your early attention to this important matter.



ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

DRAFT

16 January 1956

Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342

AWD:at

* Contacts with Non-Soviet Bloc scientists and coverage of international scientific conferences are considered to be increasingly valuable for obtaining information on Soviet Bloc scientific activities.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Scientific Intelligence

1. Intelligence with respect to scientific achievements in the Communist bloc countries is a highest priority target. This includes in particular intelligence relating to developments in the field of atomic weapons, guided missiles, aircraft, jet propulsion engines, electronic devices and counter devices, and the like.

2. It is my firm belief that our national security requires the utmost effort and coordination of effort to build up ^{this type of} ~~our~~ intelligence coverage in this field and also to follow significant ^{scientific} developments in the Free World.

3. The Departments of State, Defense, the CIA, and certain other agencies have a substantial potential in this field. The coordination of their work and the capabilities of each should be strengthened.

3. Recommendation No. 6 of the Clark Task Force report on Intelligence, transmitted by the Hoover Commission stated: "That the responsibility for collection of scientific intelligence be removed from the State Department and placed in the hands of the CIA, with authority to appoint such scientific attaches as may be necessary to carry on this work abroad." We do not concur in this recommendation

in the form presented. We believe that the scientific attache structure should be reconstituted under the Department of State but with technical support and guidance furnished by CIA through its Office of Scientific Intelligence.

4. Accordingly we propose for your consideration that the State Department appoint a Scientific Adviser to the Secretary of State with such title and authority as you may determine, and that a small office be constituted in the Department of State under the Scientific Adviser.

(b)(1)
(b)(1) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

mutually determine to be appropriate. CIA will undertake the appropriate analysis and dissemination within the government of the scientific intelligence reports which may flow through this office.

5. It is further recommended that the State Department designate, after consultation with CIA, Scientific Attaches to appropriate embassies abroad, in particular to London, Paris, Rome, Frankfurt, Stockholm, Tokyo, and to posts within the Communist orbit, including in particular Moscow, as the situation may permit.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

7. Arrangements should be made through the office of the Scientific^{cl} Adviser and through the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) of CIA to draw upon the resources of the National Academy of Science, the National Science Foundation, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the California Institute of Technology, and like institutions, and to enlist their support in obtaining appropriate design^Qss for the posts of scientific^{cl} ~~attache~~ and in supplementing the work outlined in this memorandum.

8. The existing foreign facilities of the Departments of State, Defense, and CIA in the scientific intelligence collection field should be closely coordinated with, or integrated into, the above proposed structure for a foreign scientific collection mechanism. Foreign targets and opportunities should be appropriately assigned as between the respective departments and agencies so as to cover the field as

adequately as possible to ensure that friendly foreign scientists knowledgeable in Soviet bloc scientific techniques or in new scientific advances in their own countries are contacted and that the flow of foreign scientific literature, particularly from Soviet orbit countries be increased.

9. I consider this a matter of great urgency and importance. From my conversations I feel assured that the American scientific community will lend its cooperation in making this program effective and in helping with the analysis of information which may be received. I bespeak your early attention to this important matter.

Suggest that *give* *to*
4. Accordingly, we propose for your consideration ~~that~~ the State Department appoint a Science Adviser to the Secretary of State with such title and authority as you may determine, and that a small office be constituted in the Department of State under the Science Adviser. [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

the extent we may mutually determine to be appropriate. CIA will undertake the appropriate analysis and dissemination within the government of the scientific intelligence reports which may flow through this office.

5. It is further recommended that the State Department designate, after consultation with CIA, Science Attaches to appropriate embassies abroad, in particular to London, Paris, New Delhi, Bonn, Stockholm, Tokyo, and to posts within the Communist orbit, including in particular Moscow, as the situation may permit. [redacted]

situation presents (b)(1)


problems and may require, at the moment, different (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

7. Arrangements should be made through the office of the Science Adviser and through the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) of CIA to draw upon the resources of the National Academy of Science, the National Science Foundation, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the California Institute of Technology, and like institutions, and to enlist their support in obtaining appropriate designees for the posts of Science Attache and in supplementing the work outlined in this memorandum.

8. The existing foreign facilities of the Department of State, Defense and CIA in the scientific intelligence collection field should be closely coordinated with, or integrated into, the above proposed structure for a foreign scientific collection mechanism. Foreign



17 January 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Scientific Intelligence

1. I return herewith your draft of a memorandum to the Secretary together with my attempt at a compromise version.

2. In my view, your draft necessarily requires a supplemental memorandum to deal with essential specifics of the program and to refute the arguments that we know are being made against the program generally in some circles in the Department.

3. I believe it would be more economical of the Secretary's time to address his attention to my somewhat longer draft which is approximately two-thirds as long as the original, omitting the descriptive material about CIA and specific examples of scientific intelligence achievements and possibilities.

4. My memorandum could be further shortened perfectly easily by putting a period at the end of the fourth line of page 5 and eliminating all the subparagraphs on pages 5 and 6, in which case it would be less than three pages single-spaced in final form.

5. I have only the following specific objections to your draft if you decide to use it:

a. In paragraph 4, I believe we should be quite specific that the job should be at the highest civil service grade as that has been the big complaint of the scientific community ever since Keofli left.

b. Paragraph 5. Our people prefer [redacted] (b)(3)
believing the latter can be covered from [redacted] and prefer (b)(3) cAct
[redacted] for closer association with the Embassy. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(6)

ROBERT AMORY, JR. //
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

DRAFT

RAMory:jb

16 January 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT : Scientific Intelligence

1. Intelligence with respect to scientific achievements in the Communist bloc countries is a highest priority target. This includes in particular intelligence relating to developments in the field of atomic weapons, guided missiles, aircraft, jet propulsion engines, electronic devices and counter devices, and the like. It is also essential for us to keep fully informed of scientific developments elsewhere in the free world. The recent history of major achievements in the field of theoretical physics and mathematics, which underlie most forms of technical advance in weaponry and communications, indicates the heavy dependence of the United States on the minds of European scientists.

2. It is my firm belief that our national security requires the utmost effort and coordination of effort to build up our intelligence coverage in this field. The Departments of State, Defense, the CIA, and certain other agencies have a substantial potential in this field. The coordination of their work and the capabilities of each should be strengthened.

3. Recommendation No. 6 of the Clark Task Force report on Intelligence, transmitted by the Hoover Commission stated: "That the responsibility for collection of scientific intelligence be removed from the State Department and placed in the hands of the CIA, with authority to appoint such scientific attaches as may be necessary to carry on this work abroad."

We do not concur in this recommendation in the form presented. We believe that the scientific attache structure should be reconstituted under the Department of State but with technical support and guidance furnished by CIA through its Office of Scientific Intelligence.

4. Security measures are of course extreme in the Soviet Bloc and are by no means negligible in countries of the free world. It would be naive to assume that really significant advances would come to our attention automatically through open literature and normal professional contacts in the scientific community.

5. To obtain scientific intelligence information abroad requires a balanced utilization of normal, professional contacts at one extreme and clandestine operations at the other. As to the first, we are reasonably confident that through our Contacts Division we are receiving and disseminating virtually all of the significant information obtained. Our Contacts Division has over [] scientific and technical "sources" on its active list, and in the last two years has issued to interested agencies (b)(3) (b)(1) nearly [] technical intelligence reports based on debriefings of these (b)(1) (b)(3) sources. But with rare exceptions such people cannot be adequately briefed or have their attentions sufficiently pointed in the direction of critical missing links in our information and the result is that much of what they report is repetitive and not responsive to our most critical needs. Unbriefed, haphazard operations are not only extremely inefficient, but also at times can be positively harmful. On the other hand every effort is being made through our covert services, using American and foreign nationals, witting or unwitting, to produce as much scientific intelligence as possible.

6. There remains a substantial area between the overt and virtually automatically receivable information and that which requires both the risks and the detailed and expensive preparation for clandestine operation. This

is the area whereby through assiduous and continued cultivation, on an open and aboveboard professional basis, confidence can be established with leading foreign scientists and scientific groups so that they will voluntarily, either gratis or on a quid pro quo basis, vouchsafe to us information, ideas, and operational opportunities that would otherwise not be forthcoming. It is in this field that the Scientific Attache is indispensable. The non-intelligence activities of the Science Attaches put them in contact with all segments of the foreign scientific community, and provide unique opportunities for overt collection of useful information including information on Soviet Bloc scientific activities. The attaches have been also of assistance in suggesting or evaluating sources, evaluating scientific information collected by clandestine means, and in facilitating contacts. The Science Attaches can be of great assistance in collecting and reporting information regarding the activities of Soviet scientists visiting non-bloc countries; this type of information may well become of increasing importance in the future.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

7. It may well be desirable at an early date to have Scientific Attaches in Iron Curtain countries, but the security and policy questions involved need further study. Relying on a peripheral-reporting arrangement for the time being, we therefore propose the following establishment of Scientific Attaches in Embassies overseas.

	<u>Present</u>	<u>Proposed Increase</u>	<u>Total</u>	(b)(3) NatSecAct
	1	1	2	
	1	1	2	
	1	1	2	
	-	2	2	
	1	1	2	
	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	
Total	4	7	11	
Cost (Estimated)	\$60,000	\$105,000	\$165,000	

In our view a senior attache should be a scientist of considerable repute but who is reasonably young, energetic and with prospects of earning further prestige in the scientific world in years to come. We have reason to believe that with the assistance of leading scientists and scientific organizations in the country, such men can be recruited for this work on two year terms with leave of absence status from their universities or companies.

(b)(1) (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

8. Washington support for the activity of the science attaches would be drawn from the entire intelligence community coordinated through the Office of Scientific Intelligence of CIA. Admittedly the above intelligence organization could handle the mechanics of guiding scientific

attaches abroad and processing and distributing their reports. But for a variety of reasons I feel most strongly that to eliminate the State Department's Science Adviser's Office would be undesirable from the point of view of this Agency, of the Department, and the national interest generally:

a. The formulation of national policy is so intimately affected by scientific developments that, in my opinion, the Secretary of State should have available as part of his personal staff an outstanding scientist. The position of Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs has existed for several years but interrelation of science and foreign policy are by no means restricted to the field of Atomic Energy.

b. There is a definite need for a focal point within the Department of State where policy guidance on scientific matters can be obtained by individual scientists, scientific organizations, and other departments and agencies for the government including our own clandestine services.

c. To attract the best qualified individuals into the attache program will require the backing generally of the scientific community. This will be most readily obtainable if the Department of State rather than CIA is not only the ostensible but also the actual sponsor and headquarters of the program. The non-intelligence duties of the scientific attache will increase the attractiveness of the job and facilitate recruitment. Furthermore these duties will permit the scientific attache to do a better job of intelligence by improving his contacts in scientific circles.

d. The science attaches can perform many useful services in supporting the Embassy in other than intelligence activities. To maximize this potential it is highly desirable that there be a senior officer in the Department cognizant of their potentialities and need for support. It would be quite inappropriate for CIA to assume responsibility for this portion of the program.

e. The fact that the Hoover Commission recommended transfer of the science collection activity to CIA was published. In certain areas of the world the establishment, therefore, of a scientific attache simultaneously with the abolition of the science adviser's office in the Department would be taken as clear proof that the attache was in fact a CIA employee. At best this would seriously inhibit success of his mission and at worst might result in his being declared persona non grata.

f. Substituting the National Science Foundation or some other government body as the nominal apex of the structure would introduce undesirable complexity and difficulties with regard to transmitting highly sensitive requirements and information of an operational nature. Moreover it would initially involve indoctrinating an entire new agency in the activities of the intelligence community.

9. I, therefore, propose that the Department at an early date appoint an outstanding scientist as Science Adviser at the highest Civil Service grade. For his immediate staff we estimate that two or three professional and two or three clerical employees should be assigned. CIA would assist

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

10. This program would constitute a minimum effort and would have to be supplemented by appropriate use of other agencies of the government such as the National Science Foundation and by private organizations such as the National Academy of Science and various more specialized professional bodies. This could be done on a well coordinated basis to take advantage of particularly talented individuals when specific opportunities to utilize them develop.

11. I consider this a matter of great urgency and importance. From my conversations I feel assured that the American scientific community will lend its cooperation in making this program effective and in helping with the analysis of information which may be received. I bespeak your early attention to this important matter.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director